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A RECURRENT PROBLEM IN TRANS-
NATIONAL LITIGATION: THE
EFFECT OF FAILURE TO
INVOKE OR PROVE THE
APPLICABLE FOREIGN
LAW*
Rudolf B. Schlesingert
I
INTRODUCTION: THE ELEMENTS OF COMPLEXITY
When, under the forum's choice of law rules, some or all of the
substantive issues in a case are governed by the law of another coun-
try, but the parties fail to give timely notice of the foreign law or to
show what it is, how is the court to arrive at a decision? This question
presents itself with considerable frequency.' The courts and legal
writers have paid a great deal of attention to the matter;2 but the
* The substance of this Article was originally presented at Columbia University Law School
on the occasion of the 1973 Parker School Conference "On Interaction of Foreign and Domestic
Law in Settlement of Disputes in the United States." In the present version, the text of the
original talk has been revised only slightly; but the footnotes have been considerably aug-
mented. In doing this, the author received valuable assistance from Richard D. Avil, Jr., a
member of the Cornell Law School Class of 1974. This help is gratefully acknowledged.
As a member of the U.S. Government's Advisory.Committee on International Rules of
Judicial Procedure (see Act of September 2, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-906,72 Stat. 1743), the author
was one of the draftsmen of Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. It goes without
saying, however, that the views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily
reflect the thinking of any of the other individuals or groups that had a hand in formulating and
promulgating Rule 44.1.
t William Nelson Cromwell Professor of International and Comparative Law, Cornell
University. Dr.Jur. 1933, University of Munich; LL.B. 1942, Columbia University.
' See, e.g., Lady Nelson, Ltd. v. Creole Petroleum Corp., 286 F.2d 684 (2d Cir. 1961); Philp
v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1958); Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 66 N.J. Super. 277, 168 A.2d 851
(Ch. 1961); Sonnesen v. Panama Transp. Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948),reargument
denied, 298 N.Y. 856, 84 N.E.2d 324, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949). See also cases collected in
Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 529 (1961); notes 3-128 infra.
2 See, e.g., R.B. SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAW 148-84 (3d ed. 1970); Keeffe, Landis &
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voices of those who have treated the problem are not in harmony, and
by virtue of the remarkable discordance of some of the suggested
approaches the whole subject has acquired the reputation of being
controversial and confused. It may be useful, therefore, as a first step
to analyze the elements of the existing confusion. At least three such
elements can be discerned.
A. Simplistic "Single Rule" Response to Diverse Problems
The basic problem is invariably defined in abstract language such
as "failure to invoke or prove the applicable foreign law."3 This
abstraction may be useful for some purposes; but it tends to make us
forget that, like many other abstract expressions, it covers a great deal
of ground. In fact, it applies to a variety of situations which in
functional and practical terms, and in terms of simple justice, do not
necessarily call for uniform treatment.
A litigant's failure to give notice and to provide information as to
the applicable foreign law may be due to many diverse reasons.
Perhaps his lawyer is incompetent, and hence does not realize that a
case involving foreign elements cannot be handled like an ordinary
domestic case. Or maybe the lawyer has recognized that there is a
possible foreign law problem, but has wrongly assumed that the court
either would apply the forum's own domestic law, or would place the
burden of invoking and proving the foreign law on his opponent. In
other cases, the lawyer failing to plead and prove the foreign law may
be a tricky type. Perhaps he has looked at the foreign law and has
found it less favorable to his client than the internal law of the forum.
Thus, regardless of the rules on choice of law and burden of proof, he
speculates that he might be able to trick his less sophisticated oppo-
nent into handling the case as a domestic one until it becomes too late
for either party to invoke the foreign law. Sometimes the lawyers on
both sides-each analyzing the forum's internal law, the choice of law
rule and the burden of proof in a different manner-try to outsmart
each other in this way. In still other cases, an attorney, without being
Shaad, Sense and Nonsense About Judicial Notice, 2 STAN. L. REV. 664 (1950); Miller, Federal Rule
44.1 and the "Fact' Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knellfor a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65
MICH. L REv. 613 (1967); Nussbaum,ProofofForeign Law in New York: A ProposedAmendment, 57
COLUm. L. REv. 348 (1957); Nussbaum, The Problem of Proving Foreign Law, 50 YALE L.J. 1018
(1941); Stern, Foreign Law in the Courts: Judicial Notice and Proof, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 23 (1957);
Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 529 (1961).
' See Leary v. Gledhill, 8 N.J. 260, 267, 84 A.2d 725, 728 (1951): "Thus the failure to plead
and prove the foreign law has not generally been considered as fatal." See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:82-27 (Sup p. 1973): "In the absence of... pleading or notice [of the law of another country],
it shall be presumed that the common law of such State is the same as the common law as
interpreted by the courts of this State."
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either incompetent or tricky, may soundly conclude that to prove the
foreign law, or to submit materials relating to it, is simply too expen-
sive for his client. The assumption that a single and simple rule will do
justice to all of these motley situations surely is one of the causes of the
existing confusion.
B. Antithetical Theories
The second element of confusion results from the scholars' in-
ability, thus far, to develop a viable theory for dealing with our
problem. In every legal system it has long been the habit of courts and
scholars to nose the problem in the form of the question whether
foreign law should be treated as fact or law.4 This is most unfortunate,
because either of these theoretical characterizations, if consistently
applied, leads to absurd results. The ultimate absurdity reached
under the "face' theory5 is that issues of foreign law have to be
determined by thejury.6 It is no less faulty, however, indiscriminately
to equate foreign law with domestic "law." Since the ascertainment
and interpretation of foreign law require skills which the court
simply does not possess, the procedural treatment of a foreign law
question cannot be quite the same as that of a question of domestic
law.7 The soundest approach would be to give up all attempts to
characterize foreign law as either "fact" or "law" and to start writing a
new theory on a clean slate. But in the United States, at least, this
4 See Kegel, Zur Organisation der Ermittlung Ausliindischen Privatrechts, 1 FESTSCHRIFr FOR
NIPPERDEY 453 (1965); Sass,ForeignLaw in CivilLitigation: A Comparative Survey, 16 Am.J. CoMP.
L. 332 (1968); Zajtay, The Application of Foreign Law, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW 14-1 (1972); Zajtay, Le traitement du droit itranger dans le procs civil-Etude de
droit comparg, 4 RiVISTA DI DIRrrrO INTERNAZIONALE PRIVATO E PROCESSUALE 233 (1968).
5 Under the "fact" theory, a court is not expected to know the applicable foreign law in the
same way that it is presumed to know the law of its ownjurisdiction. Rather, the foreign law must
be brought to the court, through pleading and evidence, in the same manner that any other fact
must be shown. See Liechti v. Roche, 198 F.2d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1952).
6 For a discussion of this point, see Fitzpatrick v. International Ry., 252 N.Y. 127, 136-41,
169 N.E. 112, 116-17 (1929). In most common-lawjurisdictions, legislative action was required
in order to overcome the effect of this logical but absurd deduction from the "fact" theory. See
R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 69, 72.1 In Diaz v. Gonzalez, 261 U.S. 102, 106 (1923), Mr. Justice Holmes commented on the
plight of an American court faced with a civil law problem:
When we contemplate such a system from the outside it seems like a wall of stone,
every part even with all the others, except so far as our own local education may lead us
to see subordinations to which we are accustomed. But to one brought up within it,
varying emphasis, tacit assumptions, unwritten practices, a thousand influences gained
only from life, may give to the different parts wholly new values that logic and
grammar never could have got from the books.
Moreover, a court may not have access to libraries with sufficient foreign law materials to allow it
to find and verify the applicable rules of foreign law.
1973]
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seems almost impossible. American common-law doctrines, 8 and in
large part the pertinent statutes, 9 are so clearly based on the fact
theory that in dealing with existing law we cannot afford completely
to dismiss that unsound theory from our minds.
The difficulties flowing from the use of the fact-law dichotomy
are intertwined with, and compounded by, the well-known and tedi-
ous battle between two contending conflict of laws theories. The
vested rights theory, as preached by Holmes1 ° and Beale," had, until
recently, a strong impact on the case law in this area. 2 According to
the apostles of that theory, it is axiomatic that a foreign cause of action
is an obligatio created by the command of a particular foreign
sovereign.1 3 The cause of action does not exist apart from the foreign
law which creates and defines it. If one accepts this premise, and
combines it with the "fact" theory, it follows with logical necessity that
a plaintiff who alleges a cause of action governed by foreign law, but
fails to allege and prove the relevant command of the foreign
sovereign, has failed to show one of the material "facts" of his case and
thus must lose.' 4 The same fate befalls a defendant who fails to allege
s See notes 24-78 and accompanying text infra.
a See R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 67-69.
One should not overestimate the significance of statutory provisions such as the last
sentence of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44. 1, which provides that the court's determination
of the foreign law (if such determination is made) "shall be treated as a ruling on a question of
law." This does not mean that a question of foreign law shall for all purposes be treated as a
question of law. The effect of this provision is merely to make it clear that an issue of foreign law
is to be determined by the court, and not by the jury, and that for purposes of appellate review
the trial court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law. Plainly, it was not
the intention of the draftsmen of Rule 44.1 to equate foreign law and domestic law in all
respects. If that had been the intention, the responsibility for ascertaining the foreign law would
have been thrown wholly upon the court, and the court would have been instructed to ascertain
the foreign law regardless of the assistance or lack of assistance offered by the parties. The most
cursory glance at the second sentence of Rule 44.1 shows that such was not the intent of the
draftsmen. That sentence leaves it to the discretion ofthe court whetherjudicial notice should
be taken of the foreign law. It is a well-known fact that in the exercise of that discretion the
courts tend not to conduct independent research concerning alien law when they have received
no aid from counsel. Thus, it is crystal clear that foreign law is not treated like domestic law,
which under all circumstances, and regardless of party presentation, mustalways be ascertained
and determined by the court. See Sass, supra note 4, at 342-47.
10 See Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912); Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120
(1904).
11 3 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 1968-69 (1935).
12 See, e.g., Philp v. Macri, 261 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1958); Cosulich Societa Triestina Di
Navigazione v. Elting, 66 F.2d 534 (2d Cir. 1933); Industrial Export & Import Corp. v.
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corp., 302 N.Y. 342,98 N.E.2d 466 (1951); Riley v. Pierce Oil
Corp., 245 N.Y. 152, 156 N.E. 647 (1927).
, See Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
'4 We repeat that the only justification for allowing a party to recover when the cause
of action arose in another civilized jurisdiction is a well founded belief that it was a
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and prove the foreign law on which an affirmative defense is based.' 5
The local-law theory, on the other hand, postulates that the
internal law of the forum governs all aspects of a case unless a
sufficient justification is shown for displacing it; and according to at
least some of the modern anti-Bealeans, such as Professor Ehrenz-
weig and the late Professor Gurrie, the law of the forum is never
effectively displaced unless the applicable foreign law has been in-
voked in proper and timely fashion.16 Thus, if the parties fail to
invoke the pertinent foreign law, the court will look to its own domes-
tic law as the rule of decision.' 7
Among the scholars, the antithetical nature of these two theories
has engendered a continuing controversy conducted with the
earnestness and reckless abandon of a Holy War.
To make things worse, the violent disagreement between the
contending scholarly camps concerns not only the solution of the
problem, but even its nature and curricular allocation. The "fact"
theory, with its emphasis on establishing the foreign law by formal
proof or by certain presumptions, had the effect of largely allocating
the whole problem to the field of Evidence.' 8 Those scholars, how-
ever, who prefer to formulate the problem in terms of "displacement
of the law of the forum," claim that it constitutes an important and
indeed basic Conflict of Laws issue.' 9 This debate about the proper
allocation of the problem, which at first blush appears to be mere
academic infighting, is not without practical significance; in the fed-
eral courts, the Erie doctrine and the terms of the Enabling Act20
make it necessary to determine whether the problem is procedural or
substantive.
cause of action in that place. The right to recover stands upon that as its necessary
foundation. It is part of the plaintiff's case, and if there is reason for doubt he must
allege and prove it.
Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 479 (1912). See cases cited in note 15 infra.
15 See Tidewater Oil Co. v. Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962); Eislerv. Soskin, 272 App.
Div. 894, 71 N.Y.S.2d 682 (1st Dep't 1947), affd, 297 N.Y. 841, 78 N.E.2d 862 (1948).See also
note 40 infra.
16 See B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3-76 (1963), reprinted from
Currie, On theDisplacement oftheLaw of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 964 (1958); A. EHRENZWEIG,
A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAws 360 (1962); Ehrenzweig & Westen, Fraudulent Con-
veyances in the Conflict of Laws, 66 MICH. L. REv. 1679, 1685-90 (1968).
" See, e.g., Michael v. S.S. Thanasis, 311 F. Supp. 170,176 n. 10, 177 (N.D. Cal. 1970).See
also 1700 Ocean Ave. Corp. v. GBR Associates, 354 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1965); Leary v. Gledhill, 8
N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951). For further references, see note 50 infra.
18 See, e.g., MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 335, at 779 (2d ed. 1972).
19 See,e.g., Ehrenzweig, TheLexFori-Basic Rule in the Conflict of Laws, 58 MICH. L. REV. 637,
678-79 (1960).
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
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C. The Complex Structure of the Pertinent Legal Rules
In every American jurisdiction, there has been a considerable
growth of common-law rules concerning the consequences of a fail-
ure to plead or prove the applicable foreign law.21 In almost half of
the jurisdictions-including all of those which have a considerable
volume of foreign law litigation-we also find judicial notice statutes
that have been superimposed upon the common-law rules.22
The complexity arising from this interaction ofjudge-made and
statutory law is further enhanced by the fact that all of the rules
specifically dealing with the problem of invoking or proving the
applicable foreign law have to be read against the backdrop of other,
more general rules of procedure. Especially important are those
procedural rules which determine when and how a foreign law issue
has to be raised in order to be considered by the trial judge and to be
preserved for appellate review. 3
In order to chart a path through this complex maze of legal
rules-judge-made and statutory, specific and general-the discus-
sion which follows will initially separate (1) the common-law back-
ground, (2) the judicial notice statutes, and (3) the relevant pro-
cedural rules of a more general nature. Only on the basis established
by such separate analysis, can we examine the interaction of the three
sets of rules.
II
SURVEY OF EXISTING LAW
A. The Common Law
1. Conventional Analysis: Split Among Conflicting "Rules"
The common-law rules are presented by most of the commen-
tators as reflecting a basic split, and a superficial examination seems to
lend some credence to the conclusion that the courts are divided. On
the one hand, there are decisions influenced by the vested rights
theory and thus leaning toward the rule that a cause of action or a
defense based on foreign law is lost if the party asserting it fails to
plead and prove the applicable foreign law.2 4 The classical example is
the infamous case of Crosby v. Cuba Railroad Co., 25 in which the
21 See notes 24-78 and accompanying text infra.
22 See notes 79-106 and accompanying text infra.
23 See, e.g., FED. R. Cxv. P. 51; N.Y. CIy. PRAC. LAW §§ 4017, 5501(a)(3) (McKinney 1963);
id. § 4110-b (McKinney Supp. 1973).
24 See cases cited in note 12 supra.
25 222 U.S. 473 (1912).
[Vol. 59:1
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opinion was written by the most fanatical of vested rights fanatics, Mr.
Justice Holmes himself.26 In the Crosby case, the plaintiff became
aware of a defect in his employer's machinery. He reported this
dangerous situation and was promised that it would be quickly
rectified. In the meantime, the plaintiff was instructed to continue
with his work.27 An accident caused by the defective machinery en-
sued, and the plaintiff lost a hand. Although the accident had taken
place in Cuba, and no evidence was introduced concerning the ap-
plicable Cuban law, the trial judge allowed the jury's verdict for the
plaintiff to stand.28 Both he29 and a majority of the court of appeals3"
placed on the defendant the burden of proving that the foreign law
was different from the law of the forum. Under the forum's law the
plaintiff was entitled to recover. In reversing and remanding for a
new trial, the Supreme Court, per Mr. Justice Holmes, disagreed with
the rationale of the lower courts. According to Justice Holmes, the
plaintiff had the burden of pleading and proving the specific Cuban
law which defined his right of recovery. 31 The plaintiffs failure to
meet this burden brought about his defeat.
The courts, however, have always recognized important excep-
tions to the orthodox rule applied 32 in the Crosby case. Under the
exceptions, the internal law of the forum will be applied whenever it is
reasonably probable that the foreign law in question is similar to
domestic law. Such likelihood of similarity exists (1) when the foreign
country belongs to the common-law orbit,33 and (2) in any event,
26 Eight years before the Crosby case, Holmes had delineated his theory of"vested rights" in
Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120 (1904). He posited:
The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was subject to no
law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, anobligatio, which, like other
obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be
found.... But as the only source of this obligation is the law of the place of the act, it
follows that that law determines not merely the existence of the obligation,... but
equally determines its extent.
Id. at 126 (citations omitted).
27 222 U.S. at 477.
28 Id. at 477.
29 On a motion, after trial, to set aside the jury verdict, the judge emphatically stated:
He [the plaintiff] had the right to set forth a cause of action, which, according to the law
of the forum, would be complete, and, in the event of a conflict between the lex loci and
the lex fori, the defendant ought to have shown by a proper plea that, under the lex
loci, the plaintiff acquired no right of action.
Crosby v. Cuba R.R., 158 F. 144, 147 (C.C.D.N.J. 1908).
"0 See Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 170 F. 369 (3d Cir. 1909).
31 See note 14 supra.
32 Perhaps misapplied would be more accurate. See text accompanying notes 36-40 infra.
3' Judge Learned Hand has stated:
The extent of our right to make any assumptions about the law of another country
depends upon the country and the question involved; in common-law countries we
may go further than in civil law; in civilized, than in backward or barbarous.
E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48 F.2d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 1931).
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whenever the point at issue is so fundamental that even a country
outside of the common-law orbit may reasonably be presumed to
have adopted a solution similar to our own. 4
In spite of these wide-ranging exceptions, the orthodox rule has
been criticized as harsh.3 5 Quaere, however, whether the occasional
harshness of judicial decisions using the orthodox approach stems
from the rule itself or from its misapplication. If a case like Crosby
came up today in the federal courts, the orthodox common-law
approach would not lead to a harsh result. Today, the defendant
would be prevented by Rule 44.136 and by several other provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37 from raising the Cuban law
point on appeal. Thus, the plaintiff would win. Even in 1912, the
plaintiff would have won ifJustice Holmes had realized that "assump-
tion of the risk" is an affirmative defense and that the burden of
proving the Cuban law supporting this affirmative defense was on the
defendant.38 This was a case in which the plaintiff had a so-called
fundamental cause of action-one presumed to be recognized in all
civilized legal systems-while the affirmative defense was
nonfundamenta 39 and thus dependent on a proper showing of the
applicable foreign law.40 It follows that correct application of the
31 See, e.g., Parrot v. Mexican Cent. Ry., 207 Mass. 184, 93 N.E. 590 (1911). Further
references are collected in Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
35 Professor Ehrenzweig has called application of the orthodox rule a "miscarriage of
justice." A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 360.
'6 See notes 37 & 87-93 and accompanying text infra.
37 The defendant in the Crosby case raised the foreign law point for the first time after trial,
in a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. If the case came up today, it would be
arguable that, regardless of the merits of the foreign law point, the defendant had waived its
objection concerning that point, and that the intermediate appellate court was authorized and
indeed compelled by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(h)(2) and 51 to affirm the judgment
for the plaintiff. Cf Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587 (8th Cir. 1949).
38 See James,Assumption ofRisk Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 195-96 (1968) and
authorities cited therein.
39 Clearly, it cannot be taken for granted that assumption of risk as a complete defense is
universally recognized by civilized legal systems. In our own country, the defense has been
abolished, by statute or judicial decision, in a number ofjurisdictions. See W. PROSSER, LAw OF
ToRTs 454-57 (4th ed. 1971). Even in states where the defense still exists, it would be unlikely to
prevail in a case in which, as here, the defendant employer promised to repair the defective
machinery and requested the employee to continue its use in the meantime. See id. at 452.
41 See cases cited in note 15 supra.
On the other hand, when the plaintiff's cause of action and defendant's affirmative defense
both were based on "fundamental" principles, and the plaintiffsought to counter the defense by
a reply not borne out by such principles, the burden of proving the foreign law (i.e., the foreign
law supporting the reply) was held to be on the plaintiff.See E. Gerli & Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 48
F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1931); Mangrelli v. Italian Line, 208 Misc. 685, 144 N.Y.S.2d 570 (Sup. Ct.
1955).
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orthodox rule and its recognized exceptions would have led to the
correct result: affirmance of the judgment for the plaintiff.
Another famous case often cited by the critics of the orthodox
approach is Walton v. Arabian American Oil Co. 41 Walton was an Ameri-
can citizen who was temporarily in Saudi Arabia. While there, he
suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident 42 when his car
collided with one of the defendant's trucks. Neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant, an American corporation, attempted to prove the
applicable law of Saudi Arabia. Under the New York conflict of laws
rules as they stood at the time of the Walton case, the substantive law of
the place where the tort occurred was controlling. 43 Thus, the burden
was thought to be on the plaintiff to prove the applicable Saudi
Arabian law. Because he did not do so, the trial judge dismissed the
action. This judgment was upheld reluctantly by the court of
appeals. 44 The result in Walton was not quite as revolting as that in
Crosby, because in the Walton case the plaintiff's counsel had been
warned repeatedly by the trial judge that the plaintiff would lose if he
did not prove the law of Saudi Arabia. 45 Whatever harshness re-
mained was, perhaps, the result of the rigid choice of law rule prevail-
ing at that time, and not of the orthodox approach to the conse-
quences of failure to prove the foreign law. In 1971, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Texas had to deal with a
case the facts of which were virtually identical with those of Walton,
except that the accident occurred in Libya rather than in Saudi
Arabia. 46 In that case, the problem of invoking and proving Libyan
41 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
42 Id. at 542.
43 Id. Prior to Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743
(1963), New York generally applied the rule oflex loci delicti to all substantive issues arising in a
tort case.
44 The only opinion in the case was written by Judge Frank, who, in part, dissented from
the majority holding. See note 126 and accompanying textinfra. In that opinion, which under-
took to express both the views of the majority and the reasons for his own dissent,Judge Frank
stated:
This conclusion [that dismissal of the action should be affirmed] seems unjust for
this reason: Both the parties are Americans, The plaintiff was but a transient in Saudi
Arabia when the accident occurred and has not been there since that time. The
defendant company engages in extensive business operations there, and is therefore in
a far better position to obtain information concerning the "law" of that country. But,
under the New York decisions which we must follow, plaintiff had the burden. As he
did not discharge it, a majority of the court holds that the judge correctly gave
judgment for the defendant.
233 F.2d at 545 (footnotes omitted).
45 See id. at 545-46.
46 Couch v. Mobil Oil Corp., 327 F. Supp. 897 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
19731
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59:1
law was avoided because the court, focusing on the parties' common
nationality and domicile, decided that Texas was the state of the most
significant relationship,47 and hence applied the substantive law of
Texas.48 Thus, by adopting a more flexible choice of law rule, the
court was able to hold in favor of the plaintiff and to obviate repetition
of the Walton scenario. 49
We must now turn to a different line of cases which, to the
superficial observer, seems irreconcilable with Crosby and its off-
spring. In these cases, which are quite numerous,50 failure to invoke
or to prove the otherwise applicable foreign law led the courts to
apply the domestic law of the forum. 51 Sometimes, as in the late Chief
Justice Vanderbilt's well-known opinion in Leary v. Gledhill,52 this
result is explained in terms of the parties' acquiescence.53 On other
occasions, it has been said that domestic law should be applied be-
cause it is the only law the court knows; or the case was decided in
accordance with the forum's internal law without any explanation at
all. 54 Those who follow the teachings of Professor Ehrenzweig or of
47 Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145, 146 (1971).
48 327 F. Supp. at 905.
49 Even if, as a matter of choice of law, the court had held that some of the relevant
substantive issues in the case were governed by the law of Libya (which remained unproved), a
satisfactory result-more satisfactory than the result in Walton-could have been reached under
the modern approach explained below. In light of the fact that the defendant had much easier
access to the sources of the applicable foreign law than the plaintiff, a modern court might well
place the burden of proving such law on the defendant, with the understanding that the
substantive law of the forum will be applied if that burden is not met. See note 73 and
accompanying text infra. In other words, tinkering with choice of law rules is not the only
method by which a court today could avoid the harshness of the Walton result.
50 See cases collected in §§ 3-6 of Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 529 (1961), and in RESTATEMENT,
supra note 47, at § 136, Reporter's Note on commenth (1971) (with references concerning rule
in England).
51 This approach might be called the forum-law approach, as distinguished from the
orthodox approach exemplified by Crosby.
52 8 N.J. 260, 84 A.2d 725 (1951).
53 Chief Judge Vanderbilt stated:
The presumption that in the absence of proof the parties acquiesce in the application
of the law of the forum, be it statutory law or common law..., may be universally
applied regardless of the nature of the controversy .... We are of the opinion,
therefore, that in the instant case the rights of the parties are to be determined by the
law of New Jersey which unquestionably permits recovery on the facts proven.
Id. at 269-70, 84 A.2d at 730.
54 We agree... that the general, if not universal, rule is that the rights of succession of
a husband to personal property of his wife is [sic] governed by the law of the domicile of
the owner at death.... [In the instant case, there was no pleading or proof as to what, if
any, marital rights Wackwitz would have, or what conduct, if any, on his part would
forfeit such rights under the laws of his wife's domicile. We cannotjudicially notice the
law of Germany .... In the absence of proof of such law we must apply the law of
Missouri.
Lane v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 356 Mo. 76, 82, 201 S.W.2d 288, 291 (1947); see Savage v.
O'Neil, 44 N.Y. 298, 300-01 (1871).
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the late Professor Currie will, of course, explain all these decisions on
the ground that, as a matter of choice of law doctrine, the forum's
internal law remains the rule of decision unless it is displaced by a
properly invoked foreign law.55
This approach, too, contains some seeds of unfairness. Suppose
the plaintiff has cleverly chosen a forum that has little connection with
the transaction, but whose domestic law favors the plaintiffs side. If
the court is willing to substitute its own law for the properly applicable
but unproved foreign law, then the plaintiff by this maneuver has
successfully relieved himself of the burden and expense of proving
the foreign law, and has thrown that burden on the defendant.
Again, it is important to recognize that even those courts which
pay unqualified lip service to the forum-law rule, do not apply it in all
cases. There are situations in which it would be patently absurd to
substitute domestic law for the applicable foreign law. Suppose, for
instance, that the plaintiff sues for breach of contract, and the defen-
dant seeks to excuse his nonperformance by asserting that perfor-
mance on his part became impossible due to an embargo imposed by
the government of Ruritania. If in this case the defendant fails to
prove the Ruritanian statute or decree imposing the embargo, he will
lose. It would be unjustifiable to let him substitute the law of the
forum on this point. Even Currie and Ehrenzweig do not contend
otherwise; in their opinion, the explanation is that in such a case the
Ruritanian embargo provisions do not constitute the rule of decision,
but a mere "datum. '56 However, since the borderline between a
"datum" and a rule of decision has never been staked out with any
precision, this is not an explanation, but merely a statement of the
result. The significant fact is that in the view of all courts and all
scholars there are some cases in which it is inappropriate to substitute
domestic law for the otherwise applicable foreign law.57
'5 See notes 16 & 19 supra.
56 It has been claimed that there are "situations in which application of the foreign law
is required under all circumstances." But these situations are limited to those where
knowledge of a foreign law is required as a datum for the application of the domestic
rule. To determine whether defendant was negligent per se (under forum law)
because of having exceeded a speed limit prevailing at the foreign place of accident,
that speed limit must of course be established to make the complaint conclusive.
A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 16, at 362; see Currie, supra note 50, at 1012-14 (1958); Traynor,
Conflict of Laws: Professor Currie's Restrained and Enlightened Forum, 49 CALIF. L. REv. 845,873-75
(1961). It should be pointed out, however, that Professor Ehrenzweig more recently has
modified his view that except in the "datum" situations the court should always follow the
forum-law approach. See note 72 infra.
57 The following hypothetical situation, inspired by the facts of an actual case, may serve as
a further illustration. Suppose Mr. and Mrs. Meyer, natives and nationals of Austria, were
domiciled in that country until early 1972, when they immigrated into the United States and
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It follows that the orthodox rule and the forum-law rule are not
as irreconcilable as appears at first blush. When the two allegedly
conflicting "rules" and their "exceptions" are compared, it becomes clear
that almost all of the relevant decisions, in spite of their differences in
articulation, can be reconciled in terms of the results reached.
2. Suggested Analysis: A Multi-Factor Approach
In contract cases, it will sometimes be arguable thht the parties'
failure to invoke the foreign law amounts to conscious and genuine
acquiescence in the application of domestic law. This may be re-
garded as a contractual choice of the applicable law, and today such a
choice will normally be honored by American courts; 58 it certainly
must be honored in a case governed by the Uniform Commercial
Code, provided there is some reasonable relation between the trans-
action and the forum state. 59
At the opposite extreme, there are situations in which it would
violate basic dictates of fairness and common sense to apply domestic
law to legal phenomena wholly and ineradicably rooted in a foreign
legal system. 60 In these latter situations, application of domestic law
may well be unconstitutional under Home Insurance Co. v. Dick;61 thus,
became domiciliaries of New York. Their marriage was celebrated in Austria in 1971, a short
time before their emigration. In 1973, Mr. Meyer brings an annulment action against Mrs.
Meyer, in a New York court, on the alleged ground that she induced him to marry her by
fraudulent misrepresentations concerning her willingness to bear children. The facts alleged by
the plaintiff-facts which under New York law would make the marriage voidable-are proved
at the trial to the satisfaction of the court. But neither party presents any evidence or materials
concerning the pertinent provisions of Austrian law, and the court is unwilling (and perhaps
unable) independently to investigate the relevant Austrian sources and authorities. Clearly, the
annulment action must fail. It would be ridiculous tojudge the validity of this Austrian marriage
by the substantive standards of New York law. Even an express stipulation of the parties calling
for application of New York law would not be honored by a New York court in a matrimonial
case. See, e.g., Fraioli v. Fraioli, 1 App. Div. 2d 967, 150 N.Y.S.2d 665 (2d Dep't 1956). Thus, the
plaintiff must lose because he has failed to prove one of the essential elements of his cause of
action.
In this hypothetical, it seems rather doubtful whether the Austrian law can be called a mere
"datum." Concerning the issue of the validity of the marriage, Austrian law appears to be the
rule of decision. But that is only an unimportant semantic quibble. What is important is to
recognize that substitution of forum law for the uninvoked or unproved foreign law does not
solve all of the cases, just as we have seen that the orthodox approach of deciding against the
party who has the burden of proof does not always lead to sound results.
58 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
59 See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-105.
60 See notes 56 & 57 and accompanying textsupra.
61 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
In the Home Insurance case, a Mexican fire insurance company contracted with Dick to
insure the latter's tug. Dick, although technically perhaps a citizen of Texas, was living in Mexico
at the time. The Mexican company reinsured a part of its liability with two other insurance
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a court would have no choice but to follow the orthodox approach
and to make the outcome of the case depend on the burden of proof.
Between these extremes, however, there is a large middle field,
where the consequences of the parties' failure to invoke or prove the
foreign law cannot and should not be treated by way of a simple,
definite rule. The older cases, whether they favored or opposed
Crosby, often attempted to formulate rigid rules, 62 and most of the
text writers still follow this obsolete method.63 In the more modern
cases, however, an entirely different trend is discernible. Flexibility is
the new watchword. In a 1968 case, the Supreme Court of Vermont
announced that substitution of domestic law for the uninvoked
foreign law "is justified so long as it is reasonable and does not impose
oppressive consequences. 64 Judge Wisdom, speaking for the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, put it even more bluntly:
"In the interest of arriving at a just adjudication, the trial judge
should have discretion in determining whether the law of the forum,
with or without the disguise of a presumption, should prevail. 65 The
New York Court of Appeals, which previously had vacillated between
the forum-law rule and the Crosby rule,66 finally adopted a similarly
flexible approach in Watts v. Swiss Bank Corporation.67
Flexibility, of course, does not leave the courts without
companies in New York. More than one year after the boat had been destroyed by fire, Dick
sued the New York companies in Texas. Their defense was that under the terms of the
insurance policy the insured's claim had to be filed within one year. Dick sought to counter this
defense by attempting to have the Texas court apply its own substantive law, which would
invalidate the contractual one-year time limit. The trial court held for Dick, and the state
appellate courts affirmed. However, the Supreme Court, reversing, stated:
All acts relating to the making of the policy were done in Mexico. All in relation to the
making of the contracts of re-insurance were done there or in New York. And,
likewise, all things in regard to performance were to be done outside of Texas. Neither
the Texas laws nor the Texas courts were invoked for any purpose, except by Dick in
the bringing of this suit .... Texas was, therefore, without power to affect the terms of
contracts so made. Its attempt to impose a greater obligation than that agreed upon
and to seize property in payment of the imposed obligation violates the guaranty
against deprivation of property without due process of law.
Id. at 408.
The holding of the Supreme Court apparently was to the effect that since Texas had no
substantial relation with the contract or the parties, it was a violation of due process to subject the
contract to the substantive law of Texas.
62 Compare Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542 (1914), with McLoughlin v.
Shaw, 95 Conn. 102, I1 A. 62 (1920).
63 See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2536 (3d ed. 1940).
64 Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 127 Vt. 229, 234, 245 A.2d 891, 894 (1968).
65 Seguros Tepeyac S.A., Compania Mexicana de Seguros Generales v. Bostrom, 347 F.2d
168, 175 (5th Cir. 1965).
66 The vacillating course of the earlier New York decisions is traced in Justice Water's
scholarly opinion in Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
67 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 317 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1970).
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guideposts. In determining whether to apply domestic law or to
decide the case against the party bearing the burden of proof, the
courts are aided by a number of identifiable factors such as the
following:68
(a) The degree to which a strong public interest is involved in the parties'
dispute. If there is no such public interest, the forum-law approach
normally is preferable.6 9 This is true not only in contract cases (in
which the parties' acquiescence in the application of forum law may
amount to a choice of law agreement),70 but equally in noncontract
actions, provided the dispute touches nobody's interests except the
private concerns of the parties. 71 When, on the other hand, there is a
strong public interest, as in matrimonial or criminal cases, it is clear
that the parties should not have the power by their action or inaction
to determine the applicable law. In cases of the latter kind, therefore,
little or no weight should be accorded to the fact that the parties have
"acquiesced" in the application of domestic law.72
(b) The parties' access to foreign law materials. In some cases, espe-
cially when exotic legal systems are involved, the court should give
some consideration to the parties' relative ability to procure informa-
tion concerning the foreign law (e.g., the law of Saudi Arabia). 3
(c) Forum shopping. The forum chosen by the plaintiff may be
'highly artificial as well as inconvenient to the defendant. If this does
not lead to a discretionary dismissal under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, it should in any event be treated as a factor which strongly
militates against rewarding the forum-shopping plaintiff by the ap-
plication of domestic law.74
68 The enumeration which follows in the text is a slightly rearranged and updated version
of the similar list of factors previously submitted by the author in R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note
2, at 168-69.
69 See Kalyvakis v. T.S.S. Olympia, 181 F. Supp. 32, 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
70 See notes 58 & 59 supra.
71 A caveat should be noted: The criterion stated in the text may prove difficult to apply in
some types of cases, especially tort cases. At first blush, most tort actions perhaps appear to be
purely private disputes; but the public interest may enter, e.g., when a breadwinner has been
killed or incapacitated, and a tort recovery is the only way to keep his dependents off the welfare
rolls. It is hard to deny, also, that the public interest becomes involved in a tort case when the
defendant invokes the protection ofa wofkmen's compensation statute. Cf. Tidewater Oil Co. v.
Waller, 302 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1962).
It is submitted that in cases which straddle the fence between purely private litigation and
the public interest, one must look primarily to the other factors, to be listed in the text infra
under (b), (c), and (d).
72 See A. EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 182-83 (1967); Nussbaum,supra note'
2, at 1040-42. See also note 57 supra.
73 Cf. Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 545,cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956);
note 44 supra.
74 If the forum lacks a substantial connection with the transaction or the parties, applica-
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(d) The nature of the foreign legal system and of the issue involved in the
case. Finally, and perhaps most important, a judge's readiness to
substitute forum law for the otherwise applicable foreign law will be
enhanced if he can rationally assume that with respect to the point at
issue the two laws do not radically differ from each other. Such an
assumption may be based on the fact that the foreign legal system in
question belongs to the common-law orbit.7 5 Sometimes an assump-
tion of similarity may be warranted even though the foreign system in
question is part of an alien world, e.g., that of the civil law. To the
extent that the issue at hand appears to be governed by a "fundamen-
tal principle," forum law may be applied on the theory that, unless the
contrary is shown, the law of the foreign country in question, and
perhaps the laws of all civilized nations, can be expected to be in
harmony with the forum's law on that issue.76
In connection with the last point, ajudicial notice statute can play
an important role. Formerly, courts had to rely on an uninformed
judicial hunch when they assumed (or refused to assume) that a
particular cause of action or defense was based on fundamental
principles of law presumably recognized by the foreign legal system
in question or indeed by all civilized nations. Under ajudicial notice
statute, however, a court may undertake what Judge Breitel has
referred to as "cursory independent research" concerning the
foreign law. 77 Such cursory research perhaps will not enable the court
exhaustively to resolve the foreign law issue; but if it discloses that on
the point in question there is no real clash between domestic law and
the governing foreign law, this will constitute a potent factor against
using the Crosby approach and in favor of relying on forum law as the
rule of decision.78
It is submitted that if these variables are kept in mind, the actual
results reached (although perhaps not the language used) in most of
the reported cases can be reconciled. Thus, in the place of two
allegedly conflicting "rules," there emerges a flexible but unified
tion of its own substantive law may be unconstitutional. See note 61 supra. It should be noted,
however, that cases may arise in which the forum chosen by the plaintiff is not so completely
contactless as to bring this rule of constitutional law into play, but in which the forum neverthe-
less is a highly artificial one, selected by a shrewd lawyer with a keen eye for unfair advantages to
be gained by forum shopping. In such a case, the artificiality of the forum should at least
constitute afactor militating not only against the forum's exercise ofjurisdiction, but also against
application of its own internal substantive law.
'5 See note 33 supra.
7 See authorities cited in note 34 supra.
7 See Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 275,265 N.E.2d 739, 742, 317 N.Y.S.2d
315, 319 (1970).
78 See id.
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approach. In the hands of present-day courts, this approach probably
will lead to the application of forum law in the majority of cases. It
should not be assumed, however, that forum law automatically can be
substituted in every case in which there has been a failure to invoke or
ascertain the applicable foreign law. Although perhaps not overly
numerous, there are situations-especially those which involve mar-
riage and family or are characterized by blatant forum shopping-in
which, despite the parties' "acquiescence," the factors listed above
may point away from the forum-law solution.
B. Judicial Notice Statutes
Almost half of the states, including all of those in which trans-
national litigation occurs with some frequency, have enacted statutes
or rules either providing for "judicial notice" of foreign-country law
or in other ways authorizing the court, in determining foreign law, to
consider any relevant material or source, regardless of admissibility
under technical rules of evidence, and regardless also of whether or
not such material was submitted by a party. 9 These judicial notice
statutes, it should be emphasized at the outset, have not displaced the
common-law doctrines discussed above. The statutes are merely
'superimposed on the common-law doctrines, which thus retain their
vitality in the many situations in which the statutory provisions do not
lead to actual notice being taken of the foreign law.
1. Interaction of Judicial Notice Statutes and Decisional Law
Even in a jurisdiction which has a judicial notice statute, the
statute is not a solvent for every foreign law case. Most of the statutes
are permissive only, so that the court's determination, whether or not
to take judicial notice of the foreign law, is a discretionary one.8 ° In
exercising this discretion, courts naturally are disinclined to engage in
independent research concerning a strange'legal system if they re-
ceive no help from counsel. Even when the statute is drafted in
mandatory terms, the result is not very different.8'
79 For a brief survey of these statutes, see R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 67-69.
As applied to the ascertainment of foreign law, the term "judicial notice" may well be
inappropriate. A few of the pertinent enactments, such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1,
have been deliberately drafted so as to avoid that term. For good or for ill, however, most of the
relevant statutes in fact speak of "judicial notice."
Courts and legal writers generally refer to all of the relevant enactments, whether or not the
term ' judicial notice" is used therein, as judicial notice statutes. For the sake of brevity and
convenience, the same usage will be followed in this Article.
89 See note 79 supra. See also Sass, supra note 4, at 343-47.
"1 See Cannistraro v. Cannistraro, 352 Mass. 65, 70, 223 N.E.2d 692, 695 (1967) (Cutter, J.,
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Some of the more sophisticated statutes provide that in general it
is discretionary with the court whether to take judicial notice of
foreign-country law, but that judicial notice becomes mandatory if
one of the parties has given timely notice of his intention to rely on the
foreign law and has supplied the court with sufficient information
concerning such law. The idea of such bifurcation between permis-
sive and mandatory judicial notice, which first emerged in the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, 2 has been adopted, inter alia, in California 3
and New York.84 It is clear, however, that such a bifurcated rule is in
essence permissive, because it is left to the court to determine whether
the information submitted to it is "sufficient." It follows that, no
matter how the statute is formulated, cases of a discretionary refusal
to take judicial notice of the foreign law will arise with some fre-
quency.
A few of the statutes, moreover, use pleading or notice require-
ments as a restriction onjudicial notice. In California, 85 and arguably
in New York,8 6 the parties' failure to invoke the foreign law merely
has the effect of making judicial notice of foreign law permissible
rather than mandatory. But in other jurisdictions,87 and notably
under Federal Rule 44.1,8 the notice requirement may have stronger
teeth. In Ruff v. St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co., 89 the Second Circuit
held that unless reasonable written notice of the foreign law issue has
been given in the district court, the appellate court cannot look at the
foreign law. The result reached in theRuff case was a harsh one, as the
court admitted; 90 but the judges of the Second Circuit probably felt
concurring). See also Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 274-76, 68 A.2d 241, 249-50 (1949) and
cases cited therein.
82 UNIFORM Ru is OF EVIDENCE 9-10.
83 CAL. EvlD. CODE §§ 310-11, 452-53 (West 1966).
84 N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW R. 4511 (McKinney 1963).
15 See note 83 supra.
6 New York has a pleading requirement with respect to foreign law. See N.Y. Civ. PRAC.
LAW R. 3016(e) (McKinney 1963). It is nevertheless arguable, although not certain, that the
court may, and under appropriate circumstances should, take judicial notice of an unpleaded
proposition of foreign law. This result is based on the theory that an unpleaded allegation,
although it may not be proved over the opponent's objection, may yet be judicially noticed. See
R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 76.
87 See R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 68.
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 provides:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall give
notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in determining
foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony,
whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43. The court's determi-
nation shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law.
89 393 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1968).
" Ruff, a Pennsylvania citizen, was teaching law at the Arthur Grimes School of Law ofthe
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that to hold otherwise would render the notice requirement
toothless. 9' Quaere, however, whether the provision really would lose
all of its teeth if it were construed differently, e.g., as meaning that
nonobservance of the notice requirement should make the court
reluctant to take judicial notice, but would not completely destroy its
power to do so.
Whether or not it was correctly decided, the Ruff case serves as a
reminder that even in jurisdictions where ajudicial notice statute is in
existence, situations frequently arise in which the court either lacks
the power to take judicial notice, or as a matter of discretion will
refuse to do so.92 In every case of this sort, the judicial notice statute in
effect becomes inoperative; and just as in the old common-law days,
the court is then faced with the question of how it should react to the
parties' failure to invoke or prove the foreign law. Most of the statutes
are silent on this point.93 To find an answer, the court must turn to
decisional rules-the same rules which would govern in the absence
of a judicial notice statute.94 It follows that these decisional rules
continue to play an important role even in those jurisdictions which
have adopted a modern statute.
In California and New Jersey, the judicial notice statute itself
contains an express direction, telling the court what to do in case the
foreign law is neither proved norjudicially noticed.95 The NewJersey
statute, as recently amended, favors application of domestic law in
University of Liberia when he contracted poliomyelitis, an endemic disease. Ruff sued upon an
insurance policy issued to his employer. The district court dismissed the action on the ground
that endemic diseases were expressly exempted from the coverage of the policy. On appeal,
Ruff for the first time brought up the point that under Liberian law the exemption was
ineffective. The court of appeals, however, held the point to be precluded by the first sentence
of Rule 44.1. In reluctantly affirming the dismissal of the action, the appellate court stated:
"While the result is not one which we like to reach, we cannot rewrite the policy because of our
sympathy for Ruff." 393 F.2d at 502.
"i Alternatively, the court held that even if it were to takejudicial notice of the Liberian law,
plaintiff would still lose in this action against the insurance company, because Liberian law,
although it might enlarge the liability of the employer, could not change the effect of an
insurance policy issued by an American insurance company to an American insured (i.e., Ruff's
employer). See 393 F.2d at 502.
The combined effect of the court's two alternative holdings seems to be that the plaintiff
might have won his case if (1) he had sued his employer rather than the insurance company, and
if (2) he had given timely notice of his intention to raise an issue concerning Liberian law.
92 See 0. SOMMERICH & B. BUSCH, FOREIGN LAw-A GUIDE TO PLEADING AND PROOF 64-74
(1959) and cases cited therein.
93 California and NewJersey, however, provide for this contingency in theirjudicial notice
statutes. See notes 95-100 and accompanying text infra.
94 See notes 24-78 and accompanying text supra.
9" CAL. EVID. CODE § 311 (West 1966); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-16 R. 9(3) (Supp. 1973).
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such a case,96 while the much more sophisticated California provi-
sion, by vesting the court with a great deal of discretion, 97 arrives at a
result similar to that which has been reached by the most recent
judicial decisions. 98 Although essentially declaratory of decisional
law, the California statute has two original and valuable features. It
warns the court of the constitutional doubts which may be created by
imposing domestic law on a legal relationship which lacks any reason-
able contact with the forum;99 and it provides that when an action is
dismissed because of the plaintiffs failure to prove the pertinent
foreign law, the dismissal should be without prejudice. 00
2. Unproved and Unnoticed Foreign Law in the Federal Courts
A special problem confronted the draftsmen of Federal Rule
44.1. It was realized that it would be conducive to clarity if the Rule
spelled out the consequences that ensue when the foreign law is
neither proved norjudicially noticed. But there was a hitch. Although
the provision authorizing a court to takejudicial notice can be viewed
as a rule of adjective law, and thus covered by the Enabling Act, a rule
spelling out the consequences of failure to take judicial notice is more
difficult to characterize. A rule of the latter kind might be thought to
be a choice of law rule and thus beyond the scope of the Supreme
Court's rule-making power. 10 ' Because of this doubt, the draftsmen
refrained from determining, in the Rule itself, the consequences
91 "In the absence of an adequate basis for taking judicial notice of the law of any
jurisdiction other than this State, and the United States, the judge shall apply the law of this
State." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-16 R. 9(3) (Supp. 1973).
97 If the law of... a foreign nation.., or a public entity in a foreign nation... is
applicable and such law cannot be determined, the court may, as the ends ofjustice
require, either:
(a) Apply the law of this state if the court can do so consistently with the Constitu-
tion of the United States and the Constitution of this state; or
(b) Dismiss the action without prejudice or, in the case of a reviewing court,
remand the case to the trial court with directions to dismiss the action without pre-
judice.
CAL. EVID. CODE § 311 (West 1966).
98 See notes 64-67 and accompanying textsupra.
99 CAL. EvID. CODE § 311(a) (West 1966). See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930);
notes 61, 9 7 supra.
'00 CAL. EvID. CODE § 3 11(b) (West 1966); see note 97 supra. Even in the absence of a
statutory direction, a wise trialjudge normally will dismiss "without prejudice" in such a case.See
R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 155 and authorities cited therein. Nevertheless, since some
trial judges perhaps are not as wise and experienced as others, the statutory reminder is
valuable.
' Under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970), the Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules
but may not use its rule-making power to "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."
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which follow when the foreign law is neither proved nor judicially
noticed. This left a gaping hole in the Rule. According to the prevail-
ing view, this hole must be filled, at least in a diversity case, by
reference to state law.' 02 However, Professor Arthur Miller, in his
well-known "Death-Knell" article, developed plausible arguments in
support of the position that federal decisional law rather than state
law should determine the matter in the federal courts. 10 3 What
influence Professor Miller's position will have on the courts remains
to be seen. If his argument should prevail, the federal courts would
have to fashion their own rule in diversity as well as nondiversity
cases; and if past experience in nondiversity cases is a guide, there
would then be some danger that lower federal courts would feel
bound by the only Supreme Court decision directly in point: the
somewhat sinister holding of Crosby.' 0 4
3. Judicial Notice of Uninvoked Foreign Law
In those cases in which the court actually utilizes its statutory
power to take judicial notice of foreign law, the problem of the
consequences of the parties' failure to invoke and prove that law
becomes moot. True, when the foreign law in question belongs to an
alien system, and the parties have given the court no aid in ascertain-
ing it, the court normally will decline to ascertain the foreign law by its
own independent efforts; but unless the point is precluded on
grounds of lateness, this is completely a matter of discretion. Most of
the statutes make it quite clear that the parties' failure to invoke the
foreign law does not prevent the court fromjudicially noticing it, and
that the court, even though totally unaided by the parties, has the
power to undertake its own research. 0 5 Even the late Professor Cur-
rie, who strongly opposed the utilization of uninvoked foreign law,
and who for this reason criticized the sweeping language usually
found in judicial notice statutes, made it quite clear that his criticism
was presented de legeferenda. 106
Although under most judicial notice statutes the court thus has
the power independently to dig up foreign law points never invoked
102 See Krasnow v. National Airlines, 228 F.2d 326 (2d Cir. 1955),relyingon Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
103 Miller, supra note 2, at 702-15, 723-31, 746-48.
104 This danger is illustrated by Ozanic v. United States, 165 F.2d 738,744 (2d Cir. 1948).
But see note 65 supra.
10 See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAw R. 4511(b) (McKinney 1963). "Every court may take
judicial notice without request of... the laws of foreign countries or their political subdivisions."
106 Currie, On Displacement of the Law of the Forum, supra note 16, at 981.
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by a party, the question remains whether the court may and should
decide the case without having given the parties an opportunity to
respond to the results of the court's own foreign law research. This
question will be taken up below (under III).
C. Other Pertinent Procedural Rules
In many cases, of course, the initiative in finding and presenting
the foreign law will be taken by the parties, and not by the court.
When the parties make an intelligible presentation of the relevant
sources and materials, the court in general will be inclined to make
use of the powers conferred by the judicial notice statute. But fre-
quently it happens-that the parties and the court neglect a decisive
foreign law point until after the trial. Perhaps the point is raised by
the parties, or discovered by the court, for the first time in connection
with a post-trial motion, such as a motion forjudgment n.o.v. or for a
new trial.10 7 Or-and this is not infrequent-the foreign law point
turns up for the first time on appeal. 10 8 Is the point now waived or
precluded by lateness?
The answer to this question depends, in the first place, on
whether the statute contains a notice requirement, and whether the
courts have added teeth (or perhaps dentures) to that requirement.
In this respect, the judicial notice statutes differ among each other.
On the one hand, there is Federal Rule 44.1, with its express notice
requirement, which, at least in the Second Circuit, has been taken so
seriously that the foreign law point is dead unless introduced in good
time.' 0 9 On the other hand, most of the state statutes (except those
patterned after Federal Rule 44.1) either have no notice requirement
at all, or provide that the parties' failure to give timely notice does not
preclude the court from looking into the foreign law." 0
This, however, is not a complete answer to the question of pre-
clusion. Even when, as in California and New York and a number of
other states, the judicial notice statute itself contains no preclusionary
rule, belated resort to the foreign law may be precluded by general
principles of procedure. Suppose, for instance, that in ajury case the
judge has instructed thejury in accordance with domestic law, and the
107 See, e.g., Frummer v. Hilton Hotels Int'l, Inc., 60 Misc. 2d 840,304 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1969).
See also note 86 supra.
108 See, e.g., Ruffv. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1968); Sonnesen v.
Panama Transp. Co., 298 N.Y. 262, 82 N.E.2d 569 (1948), reargument denied, 298 N.Y. 856, 84
N.E.2d 324, cert. denied, 337 U.S. 919 (1949).
109 Ruffv. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1968).
110 See notes 79-86 and accompanying text supra.
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parties have failed to raise the foreign law issue by timely requests or
exceptions. In such a case, it might well be too late to argue on appeal
that the judge committed error by charging the jury in accordance
with the law of the forum. 111
Even in a nonjury case, a foreign law issue may be similarly
precluded if raised too late. Suppose, for instance, that in an action
brought in a state court the complaint alleges invasion of privacy.
Although the allegedly tortious acts occurred in Ruritania, where the
plaintiff lived at the time, the case is tried on the assumption that it is
governed by the law of the forum. After a trial without a jury, the
court holds for the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant for the first
time claims that the law of Ruritania controls, and he submits ample
materials demonstrating that under the law of that country an inva-
sion of privacy such as shown in this case is not actionable. Even
though the forum state's judicial notice statute contains no notice
requirement, the point may be precluded. It is true, of course, that
pursuant to the classical rule the defendant may at any time, and even
for the first time on appeal, point to the legal insufficiency of the
complaint. 1 2 But the classical rule has been changed in a number of
states. 113 Under the influence of Federal Rule 12 (h), 14 several states
now provide that after the end of the trial a defendant may no longer
attack the sufficiency of the complaint unless he has previously raised
the objection. 115
These preclusionary rules are technical and refined. Suppose
that in the hypothetical invasion of privacy case the trial court, al-
though applying domestic law, for some reason had dismissed the
complaint, and the plaintiff had appealed. In that event, it might be
possible for the defendant, as appellee, to urge affirmance on the basis
of Ruritanian law. Some cases, at least, seem to suggest this distinction
in favor of the appellee. 116
III See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P.51; N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 4017, 5501(1)(3) (McKinney 1963);
id. § 4110-b (McKinney Supp. 1973).
"2 See F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 135 (1965).
See, e.g., ARiZ. R. Civ. P. 12(i); N.C.R. Civ. P. 12(h); VT. R. Civ. P. 12(h).
14 FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h); see Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc. v. Shondell, 174 F.2d 587(8th Cir.
1949).
" See, e.g., Dale v. Lattimore, 12 N.C. App. 348, 183 S.E.2d 417 (1971).
In ajurisdiction in which foreign law does not have to be pleaded, or failure to plead it is not
fatal, the objection may be thought to go to the sufficiency of the evidence rather than to the
sufficiency of the complaint. Even so, however, the objection may be precluded by the
defendant's failure, at the time when he moved for dismissal at the end of the plaintiff's case or
at the end of the whole case, to specify the foreign law point as a ground for such motion. See,
e.g., J. WEINSTEIN, H. KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 4401.09 (1963).'
16 See Southard v. Southard, 305 F.2d 730 (2d Cir. 1962); Archer v. United States, 217
F.2d 548 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 953 (1955).
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In many jurisdictions, moreover, there is a more general rule
that prohibits the parties, or at least the appellant, from raising new
points of any kind for the first time on appeal.' 17 True, this rule is
applied with considerable flexibility, and it is generally thought that
an appellate court, in its discretion, can disregard the rule whenever
its strict application would lead to injustice.' 8 In spite of its flexibility,
however, the rule lurks in the appellate practice of mostjurisdictions.
A lawyer devising litigation strategy in a foreign law case thus should
keep in mind that even under the most liberal judicial notice statute, it
may be dangerous to hold a foreign law point in reserve for an
eventual appeal.
In any event, in order properly to appraise the consequences of a
failure to invoke or prove the applicable foreign law, one must realize
that the pertinent common-law rules" 9 interact not only with judicial
notice statutes but also with other, more general rules of trial and
appellate procedure, and that under rules of the latter kind a foreign
law point may be precluded unless seasonably raised. 2 °
III
SOME MODEST SUGGESTIONS
The conclusion that emerges from the foregoing survey is only
mildly encouraging. Once one discerns all the facets of the problem,
and recognizes the complex interaction among the pertinent rules of
decisional and statutory law, it becomes apparent that these rules are
rational and consistent, and that on the whole they lead to workable
solutions. Many of these solutions, however, are based on overly
complex reasoning, and scme'of them may not be entirely fair.
Our aim, in foreign law cases as much as in other types of
litigation, is not merely to develop rational rules and to devise work-
able solutions, but "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action."'12' Few will argue that in the area under
discussion we have reached, or even approached, that lofty objective.
17 See, e.g., 14 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE § 67.09 (3d ed. 1965); R. STERN & E.
GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 297 (4th ed. 1969).
"' See Jannenga v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 288 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1961), noted in 14
STAN. L. REV. 162 (1961).Seealso H. COHEN & A. KARGER, THE POWERS OFTHE NEW YORK COURT
OF APPEALS §§ 161-69 (1952); 14 CYCLOPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE,supra note 117, at § 67.09;
11 CARMODY-WAIT 2D: CYCLOPEDIA OF NEW YORK PRACTICE §§ 71:116-17 (1966).
1 " See notes 24-78 and accompanying text supra.
1o The procedural consequences that ensue when the foreign law point is raised too late,
are discussed somewhat more extensively in R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 182-83.
121 See FED. R. Civ. P. I (second sentence).
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But some progress toward that objective, it is submitted, could be
achieved by adopting the relatively modest proposals that follow.
The first suggestion is simple and not at all novel; indeed, its
adoption may be constitutionally mandated. It is to the effect that no
trial or appellate court should ever decide a case on the basis of its own
discoveries concerning the foreign law, without having given the
parties an opportunity to present arguments and materials on what
the court thinks the foreign law to be. The California statute so
provides. 2 2 The Advisory Committee Notes on Rule 44.1 express a
similar thought, but present it as if it were merely a matter of good
practice. 23 This author, on the other hand, earnestly submits that the
requirement is one of due process, and that this result is supported by
authority as well as by considerations of fundamental fairness. 124
A second suggestion is similar in spirit, but goes somewhat
further. The time has come to recognize how far the actual practice in
these matters has strayed from the mythological common-law model
of a purely adversary procedure. By the enactment of statutes which
authorize a court, in determining foreign law, to consider any rele-
vant material or source, whether or not admissible under rules of
evidence, and whether or not submitted by a party, our legislators
have taken a long step away from the common-law tradition of treat-
ing the court as a passive umpire. Our judicial notice statutes do not
go as far as the German Code of Civil Procedure, which, at least in
theory, places the entire responsibility for ascertaining tfie foreign
law upon the court. 125 Clearly, however, in those American jurisdic-
tions which have adopted judicial notice statutes, we have instituted a
system under which that responsibility is shared by court and counsel.
By way of allocating their respective functions, we have given to the
court the important power to decide whether it will consider foreign
law materials submitted without evidentiary formalities, and, even
more important, whether and to what extent it will conduct its own
research on points not covered, or insufficiently covered, by adver-
sary presentation.
122 CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 455(a), 459(c), (d) (West 1966).
1 There is no requirement that the court give formal notice to the parties of its
intention to engage in its own research on an issue of foreign law which has been raised
by them, or of its intention to raise and determine independently an issue not raised by
them. Ordinarily the court should inform the parties of material it has found diverging
substantially from the material which they have presented; and in general the court
should give the parties an opportunity to analyze and counter new points upon which it
proposes to rely.
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES, FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1.
124 See Arams v. Arams, 182 Misc. 328, 330-31, 45 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253 (Sup. Ct. 1943); cf.
Saunders v. Shaw, 244 U.S. 317 (1917). The point is also discussed in the broader context of the
constitutionality ofjudicial notice statutes, in R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 172.
12' See R.B. SCHLESINGER, supra note 2, at 185-87.
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Such tremendous discretionary power naturally engenders re-
sponsibility. Thus, a court operating under ajudicial notice statute is
under a duty to inform the parties whether, to what extent, and under
what circumstances it will take judicial notice of the foreign law.
Failure to give this vital information to the parties, and to supply it in
time to be acted upon, should be treated as reversible error. This was
the point of the late Judge Jerome Frank's somewhat cryptic but
trailblazing dissent in the Walton case126-a point the soundness of
which has become even more apparent since the enactment of Rule
44.1.
When it comes to foreign law issues, it will no longer do to say that
under the common-law tradition the issues are always formed by the
parties. With respect to the procedural treatment of foreign law, we
have largely abandoned the common-law tradition. It follows that in
performing the tasks of identifying, researching, and resolving
foreign law issues, responsibility must be shared by court and counsel.
For this reason, foreign law issues should always be brought up for
discussion at the pretrial hearing. When this is done, thejudge has an
opportunity to admonish the parties to state whether and to what
extent they intend to rely on foreign law, and what, if anything, they
propose to do in order to assist the court in ascertaining it. If it turns
out, as it often does, that each party wishes to place the burden of
invoking and proving the foreign law on his opponent, the court can
end this game of musical chairs by an immediate ruling-ultimately
reviewable on appeal-concerning the burden of proof.127 These
simple steps, designed to neutralize ignorance as well as trickiness on
the part of counsel, should be taken by every trial court faced with a
foreign law case, and it should be reversible error not to take them. 28
This does not place too heavy a burden on the court. The fact
that a case involves foreign elements, and that the law of a foreign
country might be relevant to some of the issues, usually can be
12 The writer of the opinion thinks we should remand for this reason: Apparently
neither the trial judge nor the parties were aware of New York Civil Practice Act, §
344-a [New York'sjudicial notice statute at that time]; consequently, in the interests of
justice, we should remand with directions to permit the parties, if they so desire, to
present material which may assist the trial judge to ascertain the applicable "law" of
Saudi-Arabia.
Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541, 546 (2d Cir. 1956) (footnotes omitted).
127 At the same time, the court should inform the parties whether the burden has to be met
by the introduction of formal evidence, or whether (and under what conditions)judicial notice
will be taken of the foreign law.
128 Experienced trial judges have long followed the practice suggested in the text. See
Sommerich, Comment, 4 AM.J. Comp. L. 473 (1955). For instance, in Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956), the trial judge had repeatedly informed counsel that in his
opinion the burden of proving Saudi Arabian law was on the plaintiff, and that failure to sustain
that burden would lead to dismissal of the action.
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gathered by a cursory glance at the pleadings. Upon finding that a
foreign law question potentially lurks in the case, the court clearly has
the power-under Federal Rule 16129 and its counterparts in state
court practice-to demand that the parties clarify their positions as to
what law applies and how any applicable foreign law should be ascer-
tained.
In general, it is true that a courts powers under Rule 16 are
discretionary; but when dealing with foreign law issues-that is is-
sues no longer covered by the ancient principle of purely adversary
litigation-a judicial duty to seek clarification must go along with the
power.1 30 Once all of our trial courts recognize this duty, or are forced
by appellate decisions to do so, we shall be rid of many of the complex
subtleties which today, at least occasionally, still breed sharp practices
and inequitable results in this area of the law.
129 FED R. Civ. P. 16. Under this Rule, the district court has the power, in its discretion, to
order a pretrial conference. During such a conference, the court may seek clarification and
limitation of the issues to be litigated. Moreover-and this may be of special significance in a case
involving issues of foreign law-the attorneys for the parties may be directed to consider "the
possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents which will avoid unnecessary
proof' and "the limitation of the number of expert witnesses." The court, in addition, may bring
up for discussion "such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action."
130 Perhaps it would be useful, by way of amending Rule 16 and its counterparts in state
practice, to spell out the procedural consequences flowing from the enhanced responsibility
which the court bears in foreign law cases.
